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GoALs. By George Catlin. The Well Lectures delivered at the
University of North Carolina. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957.
Pp. 150. $2.75.

POLITICAL

The author, so the dust jacket informs us, "is at once a political philosopher,
professor and practical man of affairs." All this those of us who have followed
the career of George Catlin know to be true. Yet I have another trinity of roles
to bestow on him. They make curious bedfellows, and I am persuaded that an
exploration of their peaceful coexistence can help us understand not only the
workings of George Catlin's mind, but also the workings of the world in which
we live.
A careful reading of his Weil lectures shows that Catlin has three commitments. He is, first of all, a man committed to a belief in natural law. He is,
moreover, a member of the fraternity of social scientists. And he is, also, a
democratic socialist. There will be no need to torture logic here: no attempt
will be made to show that socialism or social science can be derived from an
acceptance of natural law. It will be sufficient to see 'how these positions stand
together, how they affect one another. It will also be interesting to approach this
question through the mind and heart of George Catlin. While he is but one
among many, the coherence of his position may serve to illustrate the outlooks
of others in our midst.
On Political Goals is a tract for the times. It is a program spelling out
strategy and tactics for the Free World's conflict with World Communism. It is
at the same time a plea to the West to put its own house in order. No follower
of Catlin's work will be surprised to learn that the capstone of his program is a
Commonwealth of Free Nations based on what he calls "the power house of the
West": the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Whether or not it is
realistic - or even idealistic - to talk of such an alliance is not my present concern. What I wish to do is to see if I can discover how the structure of values
which is implicit and explicit in his thinking has come to be built.
Ever since the appearance of The Science and Method of Politics over thirty
years ago, Catlin has been in the vanguard of social scientists. Always optimistic
about man's potentialities for understanding himself, he has readily acknowledged
the importance of the humble fact. Yet Catlin is a man of judgment. Social
science is, after all, a method. He claims no more than this. If the scientific
study of society appears to take the proportions of an ideology, that is the fault
not of the discipline itself but of some overzealous social scientists who wax too
eloquent about the unlimited vistas of their calling. It is easy - all too easy - to
184
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denigrate the toilers in the vineyard: the fact-collectors. Professor Eric Vogelin,
for example, has read his Auguste Comte and thereupon decided to write off
as latter-day gnostics all of Comte's legitimate and illegitimate heirs. Indeed,
by pasting a facile - not to say pedantic - label on their colleagues in anthropology, sociology, and social and clinical psychology, political theorists act as if
they have come up with an ironclad dispensation which excuses them from not
keeping up with developments in social science. How many students of Aristotle
know what the "F-Scale" is? How many experts on Hobbes can make sense out
of a "Thematic-Apperception Test"? How many commentators on the mistakes
of Marx can compute a correlation coefficient? The fact that some of us feel
that Comte was a gnostic does not mean that we have a right to stand apart
from and in ignorance of the knowledge of man and society which our colleagues
in social science are slowly and painstakingly accumulating.
Catlin never deserted the ranks of social science. No program, no policy,
can be viable save by resting on a studied knowledge of human psychology and
social structure. And such knowledge must be more than intuitive. The "nature
of man" is not to be understood simply by the process of turning our minds inward. The assumption of all too many intelligent people is that they already
know the significant facts. They read informative newspapers and magazines;
they even chat with taxicab drivers. The supposed sufficiency of common sense
is one of the grosser fallacies of our time. The "well-informed" layman of today
has, in the final analysis, as stereotyped an -image of his world and his fellow
citizens as that of the taxi drivers who help to set the stage for him. What are
the effects, for example, of segregation on the mind of the upper middle-class
Negro? Does the average intelligent white man know? Would he know how to
find out? Would he know how to interpret such clinical tests as he might come
across? The psychological impact of segregation is a factual matter. And the
facts in question must be uncovered by techniques which only the specialist can
employ with any effectiveness. Facts such as these are central to a serious understanding of man. We cannot, to be sure, have facts about everything we want.
But there is a far larger potential area of empirical knowledge within our grasp
than most laymen will admit.
Next we have Catlin's socialism. This is never made explicit in his Weil
lectures. Nor is there reason why it should be. After all, Catlin is not standing
at Chapel Hill as Labour candidate for Parliament - a role he has filled several
times in the past. Nevertheless, the rallying cries of his democratic, non-Marxian
socialism ring through. Catlin's compassion is for the small man. "What has to
be emphasized," he insists, "is a concern, of integrity, for little people, not indeed
only because they are little but because they are people." Entrenched institutions
of property, colonialism, and racial inequality ought to be swept away because
they deny the possibility of the good life to millions of human beings. Those selfstyled conservatives who make a principle of inequality are invariably the haves:
all too often victims of pride and hypocrisy, they elevate their comfort and security
to a pseudo-philosophy. Catlin is indignant, compassionate, and right. He sees
that man's need for fraternity is central. All human creatures crave an equality
of spirit and of fellow-feeling. Yet we cannot be content with a feudal or pa-
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ternalistic fraternity: neither cant about the White Man's Burden nor selfsatisfied musings about the Great Chain of Being can be allowed to confuse the
main issue. Men must be taught to live together as genuine equals: material
wealth, mutual esteem, political power-all these must be brought as close to
a parity as possible. This is Catlin the socialist. The spirit of the French Revolution, of Robert Owen, and of William Morris conjoin in a heartfelt. concern for
freedom - for the freedom of all men to live together as brothers and equals.
"The sentiment of fraternity is not something deducible from scientific surveys," Catlin contends. "It is a religious and indeed theological principle of
faith, which yet has support sociological and psychological." Here is the transition. White men in South Africa quote the Bible to postulate the inequality and
separateness of man. Rich men in Detroit call on natural law to condemn welfare legislation that seeks to help the less fortunate. How can Catlin invoke
religion, indeed theology, and speak with such certainty for equality and fraternity? Has he more title to truth than the Christians of Johannesburg and
Detroit? He admits that the sentiment he holds dear cannot be deduced from
surveys of the sort conducted by social scientists. Does this mean that his socialism is as idiosyncratic as another man's individualism - or even fascism?
No, it does not. The key lies in the sociological and psychological support
which underlies Catlin's sentiments. His conception of right is not simply
intuitive: it is also based on the facts. Through the sciences of sociology and
psychology, imperfect as they are, we know that men in the modern world are
in fundamental need of both equality and fraternity. In this respect it is interesting to note that Catlin spends some time lecturing his North Carolina hosts
on their obligation to provide equal protection under the law for all of their
fellow citizens. And the now famous eleventh footnote to the even more famous
Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, calls on the evidence of social scientists
to show that if men are to be full citizens they must be guaranteed psychological
rights as well as legal rights. Segregation, psychologists and sociologists have
found, creates tensions, anxieties, and frustrations in the minds and hearts of
those segregated. There cannot be such a thing as "separate-but-equal." To be
separate is to be unequal. This is a finding, a fact, of social science which cannot
be disputed. The average white man cannot comprehend such a view in its total
significance unless he studies the work of social and clinical psychologists. If he
does, he will learn of the subtle yet penetrating impact of institutional barriers
on the minds of men. The man who would tear down these barriers- be they
in Chapel Hill, Westchester, or Capetown - is not simply acting on sentiment.
He is also acting with the support of science. There is no other alternative.
Science gives no backing for the doctrines of racial inequality.
Nor does it, for that matter, lend its strength to the doctrine of individualism.
We have sufficiently accurate social and economic research to show us that opportunities to rise to the top are too infrequent, that the market mechanism is
too imperfect, to guarantee the chance of a good life to the larger part of
society. Perhaps, in an earlier age, when mobility was more fluid and the market
more automatic,* the individualist idea may have had some basis. But the facts
of social life today indicate that government welfare programs are not frills or
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featherbeds for the frivolous. They are, on the contrary, necessities for a society
which no longer has assurances that the material conditions for a civilized
existence will be provided by the free play of social and economic forces. Those
who advocate less government, less taxes for welfare purposes, may be sincere
and selfless men. But it is also true that they are not aware of the facts. They
are looking at the world and yet they do not see it. Bound by their interests,
they prefer an anachronistic image because it justifies their own status in society.
Catlin's chief emphasis is on man's need for community. This craving for a
settled place and the esteem of one's fellows is a constant throughout human history. But it is only as societies industrialize that the need becomes crying, even
pathological. Uprooted from the traditional community-the farm, the small
town, the urban ghetto-we are a world of transients faced with an anomic
void in life. The lonely crowd is lonely because it lacks the communal life without which a man is incapable of existing. In America, our "new" middle class
tries frantically to create the community they once knew and so need: they join,
associate, and foregather at an alarming tempo. Churches, P.T.A.'s, Leagues of
Women Voters, Country Clubs, and Coffee Hours are scheduled and scheduled
again in an effort to sink roots which will flower in meaningful fellowship. But
the soil is shallow, the product is superficial. Community must have a base more
profound than that offered by transitory suburban socializing. Here, too, social
science has made discoveries which the average intelligent man perceives but
dimly. Industrial sociologists have much to tell us about the role of the place of
work in the lives of our emerging society. William H. Whyte, Jr., may be horrified at the organization men in our midst. But the point is that our great corporations are providing communal satisfactions to large numbers in our population. Elton Mayo and his followers in the systematic study of human relations
were sincerely concerned with the problem of anomie. The development of
these corporate communities- private governments, indeed private welfare
states -is
a sign that psychological and sociological needs can be answered in
new and unanticipated institutional settings. We ought to think twice before we
deplore the social ethic. It is, after all, a building stone of these new communities of men.
And natural law? It is, as we know, central to Catlin's politics. He would,
I am sure, agree with D'Entr~ves that natural law is nothing more nor less than
the "right answer." And this answer is to be 'known by man's reason. Is democratic socialism the right answer? This depends, of course, on the time and
place. But for countries which are in the early or advanced stages of industrialization, some variant of socialism is the right answer. Whether it should be in
the corporate form as suggested by Father Ryan, or in the guise of welfare
capitalism as put forward by Russell Davenport, or in the more traditional setting
as programmed by the British Labour Party -this is a matter of means. But
the end is clear: reason, aided by science, dictates the need for community.
There is no disputing this on the ground that the reason of some men speaks to
the contrary. Such gainsayers - the advocates of inequality and individualism carry in their minds a distorted image of the world. They simply do not know
the facts of modem industrialized life. They are incapable of understanding the
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knowledge made available to us by social scientists because their interests blind
them to such understanding.
Social science is the key to natural law. Facts, and only facts, can give us
the right answer. Our danger is not that we may know the relevant facts and
yet make the wrong choices. Such an eventuality, while entirely possible, is more
a solace to the ignorant than it is a real fear. The real problem is that we are
content to make little or no effort to comprehend the complexities and subtleties
of our rapidly changing existence. All men tend to see reality only in fragments:
both haves and have-nots are bound by their interests to stereotyped images of
the world in which we live. The more we show a willingness to learn from social
science, the better will we be able to frame the right answer to real problems.
Prescriptions for a world of myths are futile. Natural law is living law - law
relevant to the world and needs of today. Before we can prescribe for reality we
must know what reality is.
This is not a simplistic call for a Utopia governed by social scientist kings.
Catlin would be among the first to insist that social science is no more than a
means to an end. Only by reason can men know the natural law. And only by
a sophisticated use of social science techniques can reason be fortified to the
extent necessary for finding the right answer. The problem is more pressing than
ever before. In our modern age social reality challenges us with its overwhelming
complexity. Yet for all that, natural law is the end. There need not be much
dispute on this. And that social science is the indispensable handmaiden of
reason ought not, on reflection, to cause much argument. For by social science
is meant not master-plans for earthly cities, but systematic explanations of the
truths of human and institutional behavior. But that social science leads Catlin
to interpret natural law in socialist accents is bound to be controverted. It is
interesting to note that most social scientists -almost all of whom reject natural
law thinking - will back Catlin's reasoning and prescriptions. And, on the other
hand, those who dispute his socialism will, for the most part, be those who
profess a commitment to natural law. My own estimate is that Catlin's antagonists, despite their natural law professions, are in the final analysis more ignorant
of the truths of man and society than his supporters. Adherence to the verities
of natural law becomes little more than verbiage if it is not accompanied by a
knowledge of the verities of the world of today. The men of natural law have
much to teach the men of social science. But this task ought to wait on a more
immediate one: those who hold to natural law must verse themselves in the
psychology and sociology of the mid-twentieth century. In this effort, George
Catlin, who stands as a mediator between the two realms, may serve as a teacher
and a guide.
ANDREW HACKER

ALFRED L. SCANLAN
By Walter Berns. Baton Rouge,
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. Pp. xiii, 264. $4.00.

FREEDOM, VIRTUE & THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

The philosophical atmosphere of the Political Science Department of Yale
University, it appears, is conducive to conservative constitutional thinking.
Professor Berns'l carefully labored effort to displace liberty or freedom in favor
of "virtue" in the nation's hierarchy of constitutional values seems to be evidence
of this. This reviewer assumes that most people are not opposed to virtue any
more than they are opposed to freedom. Unfortunately, the rub comes in attempting to identify or define both-.the significant difference then being, in
the reviewer's opinion, that freedom as a condition precedent of a democratic
body politic is much more easily understood and more safely adhered to than
recognizing and attempting officially to promote virtue or goodness as the end
of government or organized society. Let us examine the author's thesis, however,
before we attempt refutation.
The author accepts Aristotle's view that "the good state must possess virtue."
Berns maintains that the good man, or men, will give their loyalty to a bad
regime. Consequently, the vital difference between the good and the bad
regime, in the opinion of the author, is the moral character of the men who are
trusted by each regime and who in turn freely pledge their allegiance to each
government or regime. Under the author's analysis, it then follows "that a
good regime cannot trust bad men." For instance, the United States can trust
Norman Thomas and permit him to express his vigorous opposition to the policies
and composition of duly constituted governing authority. The good nation,
however, cannot afford the same luxury in the case of a Eugene Dennis or a
Harry Bridges. The good government must never lose sight of its obligation to
promote virtue among its citizens so the latter can be men who can be trusted by
the regime. The good government must curtail the opportunities of bad men,
or men who cannot be trusted, to interfere with the achievement of the good
regime's paramount objective to promote good.
As a philosophical position the author's analysis is controversial enough. He
goes further, however. As necessary corollary assumptions underlying his main
thesis, the author is forced to contend that the basic freedoms of the First Amendment (those of speech, belief, assembly, and religion) are not absolutely essential
in a democratic society; that judicial review of legislative and executive action
is basically a nondemocratic function which the so-called liberal members of
the Supreme Court have at times misapplied so as to exalt freedom at the
expense of promoting a virtuous society; and that it is the unavoidable obligation
of public authority to define the virtue or goodness which society in its laws
and through its judicial decisions should promote and impose.
This reviewer, like most rational men, admires virtue and hopes that he is
so fortunate or so deserving as to achieve it. Nevertheless, he must totally disagree with the author's thesis and the assumptions on which that thesis is
founded. In the first place, virtue or goodness rests in the realm of the conscience.
1.

Professor of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
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It is a matter with which the individual must grapple. It can never be imposed
or implanted in him through the power of the state. Dean Rostow reminds us
that it is regimes which have imposed on their citizens their notions of a social
order or a "virtuous" society, not regimes based on "open discussion and political
equality, [which] have led modern societies to the rule of the tooth, the claw,
and the tommy gun." 2 He is right. In a society where freedom and liberty are
the indispensable conditions precedent to the exercise of sovereign power and
the acceptance of that sovereign power by those subject to it, the odds are heavily
arrayed against the successful triumph of tyranny. On the other hand, in a
society where these conditions precedent of liberty and freedom are permitted
to be modified and relaxed, even for the purpose of promoting virtue and truth,
the odds against the successful emergence of tyranny--of a "bad" regime, as
Berns would say-are to that extent lessened.
To pose virtue as the end of government raises more fundamental risks than
it avoids. As Pontius Pilate said of truth, we may ask: "What is virtue?"
Jesus Christ was crucified in the name of virtue, truth, and the social order
of the Province of Judea and the Roman Empire. Other men have experienced
the same fate with the same excuses assigned by the regime that destroyed them.
When the state or regime in power assumes the role of definer, defender, and
promoter of virtue and goodness, it becomes inevitable that virtue should be
what that regime says it is.
The basic defect of Berns' thesis, in this reviewer's opinion, is that he ridicules
freedom and liberty as the ends of government, whereas really they are not ends
in themselves but the indispensable conditions or means to the achievement of the
basic ends of government. The obligation of government is to establish and
maintain the conditions under which man can fulfill his divine function and
achieve his ultimate and' immediate end, i.e., life with God forever. Therefore,
its aim is more accurately described, as Justice Douglas recently put it, to promote
and maintain "security for the individual and freedom for the development of
his talents." 3 If we believe that man is a creature of free will whose success
or failure in obtaining eternal happiness depends on his performance as a member
of society in this life, then freedom or liberty is the required condition or element
under which he must work out that destiny. True, as St. Thomas Aquinas
reminds us, man is a societal animal; he must stake his claim to immortality
in the happiness of a future heaven as he moves within the framework of an
organized society. The rules of that society should not be permitted to impair
his opportunities for achieving his ultimate destiny. Legislation or judicial decisions that curtail or restrict man's natural rights as a creature of God cannot
be sustained. Despite Justice Black's reservations about it, the "natural law gloss"
on the Bill of Rights is not misplaced. Nevertheless, this is not quite the same
thing as saying that freedom and liberty are flexible concepts or conditions of
society to be circumscribed or dispensed with in individual cases on the grounds
that those who invoke their protection are not virtuous or good men, but are men
2.
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who, in the words of Berns, are not to be trusted. If the proper obligation of an
organized society is .to promote the conditions under which its individual members
may best work out their immortal destiny, while permitting other members of
society to do the same, then the prerequisite conditions of freedom or liberty are
not to be tampered with save in those cases where they must be relaxed or
dispensed with in order to preserve freedom for the society as a whole.
Despite the author's opinion to the contrary, the fact that freedom must be
limited at times is no argument that it is anything less than the sine qua non of
the just society under the conditions of the world as it exists today. Freedom,
on occasion, must be circumscribed in order to preserve the conditions of freedom
for society as a whole. The clear and present danger test, despite the uncomplimentary things which the author has to say about it, is a recognition of this fact.
We will not permit freedom to be destroyed in the name of freedom, nor liberty
to be divested in the name of liberty. Freedom has its pragmatic as well as its
idealistic side. By and large, the Supreme Court over the last twenty years
through its interpretations of the First Amendment in cases presenting issues of
free speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, and the prohibitions of the
amendment against the establishment of religion, has recognized this. Indeed,
it has only been in a few aberrational decisions rendered under the pressures of
the "cold war" and the irrational hysteria produced in some quarters by a
psychological fear of communism and subversion that the Court even temporarily
has misinterpreted the proper functions of free government. Under Berns' analysis
those decisions could be sustained, perhaps, on the grounds of promoting "virtue,"
at least the "viitue" of the moment which, as the passage of time already has
revealed, was a good deal less than virtue in the longer run. Indeed, we do not
have to look to the historical past to see that Berns is wrong and that Douglas
is right. "Man's moral and spiritual appetite, as well as his political ideals,
[demands] that he have freedom." 4
The reviewer has said more than he perhaps should have to express his
disagreement with the fundamental proposition which Berns attempts to establish in his book. The confines of a book review preclude additional rejoinder to
some of the subsidiary arguments advanced by the author. For instance, while
judicial review may in one sense be undemocratic, as Berns suggests, to the extent
that when it is exercised in any given case it may not necessarily represent the
majority view of the body politic to which it applies; nevertheless, the ultimate
purpose or function of judicial review of legislative and executive action is in
its essence democratic. Judicial review, especially when applied to protect and
preserve the indispensable conditions of a just society, i.e., freedom and liberty,
as articulated in the provisions of the Bill of Rights and especially those of the
First Amendment, is the life preserver of the democratic, just, or "virtuous"
society. Without it, our own days would have seen the regime continue to approve
of segregation on the basis of race in all fields of societal endeavor; the stamp
of traitor imposed upon men without the observance of the essential elements
of a fair trial or hearing; and the imprisonment of, or the imposition of a stigma
4.

Id. at 90.
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of infamy on, persons for what they said or thought and not for any action they
took to execute their words or thoughts. An institution which preserves us from
such unworthy results serves the ends of the good society. Judicial review is the
last, and sometimes only effective, brake on the forces which gather from time
to time and which, if left unchallenged, would destroy freedom in the name of
freedom.
The reviewer will not dwell on the inadequacy of the case analyses which
Berns attempts at various places in the book in discussing decisions of the Supreme
Court and opinions of the various justices. He brings to bear in such critiques
what seems to be the congenital lack of equipment for the task from which
political scientists, almost as a group, seem to suffer. In addition, the author
has concentrated on the extreme opinions in which the preferred position of rights
guaranteed under the First Amendment has been sustained by the Supreme Court.
One does not have to agree with each and every decision of the Supreme Court
in cases arising under the First Amendment, or other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, to maintain that the Court, and especially Justice Douglas and Justice
Black - and, it appears, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan - have
correctly grasped that it is the obligation of government to preserve freedom in
order that those subject to governmental authority may be left free as individuals,
within their own conscience and by the exercise of their own free will, to develop
their talents and achieve their individual immortal destiny. A regime which
downgrades freedom and liberty in the interest of attempting to promote its own
conception of "virtue" would, in the opinion of this reviewer, have dangerously
misconstrued its proper function. A philosophy which asserts that it should merits
rejection. I reject it as it is expounded in this book.
ALFRED L.

SCANLAN

VERSUCH EINER ORENTIERUNG.
By
Erik Wolf. Volume 2 of the Freiburger Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen, herausgegeben von der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultiit der Universitit Freiburg, Baden. Karlsruhe: C. F.
Miller, 1955. Pp. xi, 119. DM. 7.00.

DAS PROBLEM DER NATURRECHTSLEHRE:

Professor Wolf, one of Radbruch's best informed disciples, is the editor of
the posthumous fourth and fifth editions of Radbruch's Rechtsphilosophie, as
well as the author of several important works on legal philosophy. Within the
compass of a mere one hundred and nineteen pages he presents what may well
be the most compact analysis of natural law ideas from the pre-Socratics to our
own time. This accomplishment is made possible by the author's arrangement.
The many natural law ideas considered are related to the concepts of "nature"
or "law." Thus, the first chapter deals with the concept of "nature," the second
chapter with that of "law." Within each chapter the various particular interpretations of either "nature" or "law" are treated as different "theses" concerning
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the meaning of these two concepts. Each thesis, in turn, is followed by an
analysis of the specific consequences which its acceptance will have for natural
law. The various jurists or philosophers who have advanced this particular
interpretation are then discussed in historical order, under the many headings or
"categories" and subheadings or "subcategories" to which they are assigned.
Thus the whole scheme devised by Wolf develops according to the following
basic pattern: Chapter I, concept of "nature," 1st thesis, its consequences, 2nd
thesis, its consequences, and so on; Chapter II, concept of "law," 1st thesis, its
consequences, 2nd thesis, its consequences, etc.
Since American scholars and students of jurisprudence may wish to know
something about Wolf's categories, the reviewer will attempt to give a short
resume of these categories, thereby conveying also a fairly adequate conception
of the book itself.
In the concept of "nature" Wolf distinguishes the following interpretations or
meanings: (1) that aspect of a thing which expresses "its" nature, i.e., its
characteristic essence (Wesenseigenart) ; (2) that which is "original," i.e., "not
derived"; (3) that which is "genuine," "pure," "unspoiled"; (4) that which
is "necessary" according to the laws of causality or logic; (5) that which is "ideal,"
i.e., "nature seen as reason"; (6) that which is "created"; (7) the "nature of
things"; (8) that which is "irrational," "impulsive," or "emotional"; and (9) that
which is "opposed to tradition."
From these nine interpretations of "nature," there follow nine different
approaches to "natural law": (1) a person's or thing's right to exist in his or
its own essential individuality; (2) the historical origin of any legal order; (3) the
pre-state social order; (4) the empirical and logical laws ruling nature; (5)
philosophical doctrines of "absolute" laws; (6) theological doctrines; (7) the
immanent practical order of life; (8) the supremacy of appetites or drives, like
the will to power; or (9) the principle of reform or revolution.
In the concept of "law," as used within the compound term "natural law,"
Wolf distinguishes nine "theses" or "meanings": (1) "objective law," i.e., "law
and right," (2) man's "convictions" of what is right (Rechtsiiberzeugung),
(3) "subjective rights," i.e., "personal rights," (4) man's "sense" of justice
(Rechtsgefiihl), (5) "just law" (richtiges Recht), (6) "utility," (7) "certainty,"

(8) "historicity," or (9) fulfillment of a "societal function" (Gesellschaftlichkeit).
The consequences of these various meanings of the term "law" for the
understanding of the compound concept of "natural law" are that the latter is
considered as (1) an objective "lex," which is to control either teaching or
legislation or both; (2) a prescientific, popular view of justice; (3) a subjective
"jus" which arises from the public order of social duties, or is innate, or is the
result of some social contract; (4) a way of feeling, either individually or collectively; (5) an "idea" which is the source of ideals, or formal principles, or transcendent thought; (6) the right to happiness; (7) identical with the positive
law; (8) historical law-restorative, up-to-date, or futuristic (revolutionary)
or (9) sociological regularity.
Since the interpretation of the respective concept ("nature" or "law") and
the consequences of that interpretation are logically interconnected or overlapping,
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the total number of categories, of course, is not thirty-six (four times nine), but
eighteen. Yet even eighteen categories, with their many subdivisions, constitute
a far greater number than has ever been suggested in any other analysis of natural
law. In some cases Wolf has classified a leading thinker such as St. Augustine,
Luther (I, 6) or Locke (II, 3), in but one category. Others have been assigned
to two (Hobbes: II, 3 and 7), or three (Grotius: I, 5; II, 1 and 3; Rousseau:
I, 3 and 9; II, 1), or even four and more (St. Thomas: I, 3, 6, 7; II, 1;
Plato: I, 2, 3; II, 4, 5, 6; Aristotle: I, 4; II, 2, 4, 5, 6). The details are
handled with the same care and erudition manifested by the author in his fourvolume work on Greek legal thought.1 Succinct particulars and reasons, as a
rule, are given for these classifications, and a stunning number of names and
2
dates are accounted for.

What, then, is the significance of Wolf's analysis for present-day political and
legal philosophy? This is the chief question he himself raises in his little book,
and it is of course our own main concern. Relativists might make good use of
this work in order to bolster their view that justice depends on ideas which are
beyond scientific demonstration. But it is not Wolf's purpose to support relativism.
His aim, as indicated by the ten-page "Introduction" and the seven-page "Conclusion," is in the opposite direction. To him there is only one true natural
law doctrine. In the conflicting or antinomic interpretations of natural law he
sees merely a necessary and wholesome dialectical discussion (Auseinandersetzung), through which the unfolding of the doctrine's fundamental meaningthe unity in diversity--can be achieved. Wolf holds that "in the seeming confusion of antagonistic theories of natural law a hidden order operates." While
he admits that the concept of natural law is ambiguous, he nevertheless insists
that its function is perfectly clear and has always been the same: to confer
legitimacy upon the empirico-historical law, and to provide a basic standard for
it. From this sustained identity of function he infers that ". . . natural law must
be a reality, which . . . practically and ethically justifies and limits all law." 3

But this "must" would be logically untenable without some metaphysical presupposition. We cannot conclude that there actually is a natural law simply
because people have always believed in it. But neither, of course, can we deduce
from this lack of logical conclusiveness that there is no natural law.
The question then remains: What is the "reality" which the natural law must
have? Wolf answers that this reality "is apparently undefinable, at any rate not
determinable a priori." It can only be "experienced, not learned, because it is
1. WOLF, GRTECHiSCirS RECHITSDENKEN, VOLS. I, II, I1I1 and III, (1 9 50-1956)-vol.
IV is still in preparation-reviewed by Chroust in 2 NATURAL LAWFORUM 129 (1957).

2. For example, in I, 2 (Nature interpreted to mean "original") Wolf discusses Hesiod,

Aeschylus, Sophocles, Plato, Daniel, Vico, Herder, Savigny, Bachofen, Frobenius, and
C. G. Jung; in a historical subdivision he discusses Thucydides, Comte, Hegel, and Marx.

In I, 4 ("causality" or "necessity") he discusses the sophists in the various stages of their
teachings, Aristotle, Ulpian, Polybius, and Cicero; in a biological subdivision he discusses
Archilochus, Mandeville, Baumgarten, Kohler, and Soml6; in a mathematical subdivision
he discusses the Pythagoreans, Aristotle, Petrus Ramus, Althusius, Weigel, Leibniz, Wolff,

Kant, Stammler, and Kelsen, as well as the Cyrenaeics, the Cynics, the Epicureans, and
the Stoics; and in a "physical" subdivision he discusses Bacon and Spinoza.
3.
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a part of being and not merely an aspect of consciousness." Somewhat apodictically he adds: "All men are committed to natural law and, hence, are agreed a
priori about the essential need-of-being of natural law, even though they are
unable to state uniformly a posteriori what belongs to it." 4 But he concedes his
inability to define the sphere in which the natural law ultimately "resides"
(worin das Naturrecht 'eigentlich' lebt). He concludes that "the idea of
natural law can neither be 'practiced' in a spirit of pedantry nor 'invented' in
a spirit of fanaticism: it must be cultivated with care. We must not desire to
control it (dariiber verfiigen wollen) ; rather, we must submit to its control."
To accept this proposition one must agree to the very thing to be demonstrated, namely, the existence of natural law. This is true unless Wolf means
that we should merely try to live with the idea and to "submit to its control"
in order to experience its truth. Wolf's next sentence does not go this far. It
seems to presuppose the existence, not of natural law itself, but only of the theory
of natural law. "The theory (Lehre) of natural law has the task always and at
all times to watch over the law (Recht), that it remain within its true essence."
It is the "duty of all who partake of law and justice (Recht) 'to be there' in
constant readiness for [the support of] law and right (das Recht)." This could be
accepted even by those adherents of constitutional government who are not as
certain as Wolf of the existence of natural law.
At the end Wolf rearranges in four categories the ways in which we may seek
after both the concept and the foundation of natural law. The question of law
and justice is, he says, "one of those fundamental questions of all sciences that
deal with being, duty ('ought,' Sollen), possibility, and justification (Rechtfertigung), i.e., the ontological, the ethical, the logical, and the metaphysical
mode of asking questions." Accordingly, he argues, we may ask four types of
questions about the natural law. We may inquire about (1) the natural law
that is, i.e., its being, its reality, as found in ever-recurrent institutions, like marriage and property; (2) the "true" natural law that ought to be, in the sense of
asking whether, e.g., institutions of marriage and property ought to exist; (3)
about the logical meaning of natural law, i.e., what the basic concepts of law are;
and (4) the transcendentalcharacter of natural law as an order of being that has
its origin not in man but either (philosophically speaking) in the cosmos, or
(theologically speaking) in God, with sanctions provided either in immanent
retribution (poena naturalis) or in the Last Judgment. Wolf holds that all four
approaches are necessary in order to establish and justify natural law. 5 As we
shall see later, this view enhances greatly the importance of the theory of natural
law.
Twice within this century the position taken by German scholars and jurists
on natural law has been markedly influenced by the particular sociological and
political conditions of the German situation. During the first decade German
social scientists of democratic leanings found themselves surrounded by nationalistic professors who freely mingled authoritarian value judgments with their
4. Id. at 109.
5. Id. at 113.
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more strictly professional teachings. This situation, which stimulated inquiries
into the differences between scientific data and purely personal preferences, led
to the scientific type of value relativism. After the demise of the Weimar
Republic, the brutal enforcement of barbaric value judgments by the Hitler
regime compelled the German relativists to reconsider their views. But Simmel,
Rickert, Georg Jellinek, and Max Weber were dead; Kantorowicz and Kelsen
had fled the country. Of the original founders of value relativism only Gustav
Radbruch stayed, although after his dismissal from his chair at Heidelberg in
1933 he had become an "inner exile." He consumed himself in the conflict
between his belief in the scientific relativity of value judgments and the call of
the historic hour which seemed to demand a "scientific" vindication of the belief
in inalienable human rights. After the war, hardly a relativist was left among
legal philosophers in Germany; they all joined the fight for the recognition of
natural law, and the profound seriousness of their motives is evident in their
many writings.
Radbruch's own modifications of his former views have greatly contributed
to this change of heart. Since Wolf's present book pays only little attention to
the development of Radbruch's philosophy,* the reviewer may be permitted to
add a few observations of his own. Radbruch, in fact, tried three different ways
to meet the problem of totalitarian government: first, by stressing the "aggressive"
side of relativism, i.e., the relativist's duty to oppose any attempt of government
to force value judgments upon people who do not share them;6 second, by
deriving some limitations for governmental decrees from the "nature of things"; 7
and third, by emphasizing the "idea of justice" as requiring not only the equal
treatment of what is equal but the recognition that all men are equal and
possess inalienable rights.8
Needless to say, this reviewer deeply sympathizes with the reasons that
motivated Radbruch to modify his earlier views. But at the same time it cannot
be denied that every one of his three proposed correctives transcends the boundaries of "science." This is true if the meaning of "science" remains restricted,
as it does in Radbruch's earlier writings, to intersubjectively communicable
knowledge, distinct from broader conceptions of science, such as metaphysical
insights and other controversial intuitions. Such transcendency is characteristic
also of all those revivals of natural law thinking in this century that go beyond

* For Wolf's views on this subject, see his article beginning at p. 1, supra.-Ed.
6. See Radbruch's paper in 4 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE f.Du DROIT ET DE SOCIOLOOIE
JURDIQUE 105-110 (1934); RADBRuLCH, DER MENSCH IM RECHT 80-87 (ed. Fritz von
Hippel, 1957).
7. RADBRUCH, VORSCHULE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIF 19 ff. (1947).
See also
FESTSCHRIFT sFOR LAUN (1948). Erik Wolf (op. cit. supra, note 3 at 87) doubts whether
the report in the VORSCHULE, edited by two of Radbruch's students, contains reliable

information.
FiJNF MINUTEN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1945) and GESETZLICHES UNRECHT UND UBERGESETZLICHES RECHT (1946). Both these works are reprinted on the appendix to RADBRUCH'S RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (4th and 5th editions, ed. Erik Wolf, 1950 and 1957).
GESETZLICHES UNRECHT UND UBERGESETZLICHES REcHT is also reprinted in DER MENSCH
iM RECHT 111-124. See note 6, supra.
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inquiries into poena naturalis,the self-avenging consequences of unethical actions.
Whether or not this abandonment of "science" or change in the term's meaning
is to be recommended, the reviewer cannot discuss here; he does so in his forthcoming book on twentieth century scientific political theory. At present he limits
himself to a few remarks on what he considers the decisive point.
Is it possible outside the area of the poena naturalis to derive from the nature
of things or from the nature of man alone moral directives, unless one assumes
the operation of suprahuman moral forces? This the reviewer doubts very much.
Without that assumption, there is no scientific ground conceivable on which it can
logically be maintained that nature--a completely material and mechanistic
nature-issues moral laws. The reviewer is, of course, aware of the fact that the
attempt to derive moral laws directly from nature without reference to divine
forces has played a great role in the history of natural law. But, in the first place,
those who inaugurated this type of secularized natural law philosophy actually
believed in the divine origin of nature. This is true not only of St. Thomas, but
also of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. In the second place, any attempt to
derive moral laws from nature alone beyond the area of poena naturalis, if
honestly pursued by a strict elimination of any vestige of divine elements in the
process of the argument, can only lead us to purely human ideas as the ultimate
determinant of moral laws. But these human ideas differ widely among themselves, except for some elements not yet sufficiently explored. 9
This is not to say that law courts, jurists, public employees, etc., must accept
as legally valid or binding even the most barbaric positive laws. These are
different questions. The basic error in recent attempts to revive ethical natural
law thinking, this reviewer believes, lies in the confusion between the problems of
the scientific and the juridical validity of the judgments which a government tries
to enforce. What types of government orders are to be considered juridically
valid is a juridical question, not one that deals necessarily with scientific validation. Society may insist that orders which violate basic human rights are juridically invalid. We must postulate some "basic norm" to the effect that government
orders in accordance with a country's constitution are juridically valid, if we
want to establish the validity of positive law scientifically. We may also reject an
unlimited formulation of this "basic norm" and substitute for it another postulate,
one which excludes from recognition as valid any orders violating basic human
rights. 10- Science cannot establish the existence of human rights without reference
to divine powers. But jurisprudence can.
After this twofold digression the reviewer once more reverts to Wolf's book.
As reported above, Wolf considers indispensable all four modes of approach to
natural law-the ontological, the ethical, the logical, and the metaphysical mode.
9. On these elements, see Brecht, Relative and Absolute justice, 6 SOCIAL RESEARCH
58-87 (1939); also reprinted in THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARNOLD BRECHT (ed.
Forkosch, 1945).
10.

The reviewer suggested this some twenty years ago in his review of EBENSTEIN, THE
This review was published in 32 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
REvIEW 1173 (1938). No one, however, seems to have taken notice of this suggestion. The
reviewer proposes to resume this particular problem in his forthcoming book.
PURE THEORY OF LAW.
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The fourth mode of approach presupposes the transcendent character of natural
law. Wolf's inclusion of this aspect among the indispensable modes of asking
questions about natural law is tantamount to his realization that it is impossible
to derive natural law from the nature of things alone (beyond the area of poena
naturalis) without accepting a transcendent ethical will which by expressing itself
through nature reaches humanity. The reviewer agrees with this.
Wolf does not care to state what he considers the proper meaning of the term
"science"; nor does he say whether he agrees that there is justification in distinguishing between scientific and speculative inquiries-between knowledge that
is intersubjectively communicable qua knowledge and between knowledge, real
or putative, which is not so communicable (although, of course, the latter type
of knowledge, too, may be "relatable"). Within the framework of his study he
does not seem to be greatly interested in this problem. However, he does remark11
that one should keep in mind that any reduction of the natural law idea to mere
"science" "restricts natural law in an illicit manner, distorts its true meaning and
blocks the real access to it." The natural law idea "partakes of a prescientific or
metascientific realm of human ability to surmise" (menschliches Ahnungsverm3gen). Likewise, Wolf does not stop to say whether he thinks that God's
existence, in which he believes, can be "scientifically" verified. Nor does he refer
to the possibility, mentioned above, of denying legal validity to barbaric
decrees not on scientific but on historical-juridical grounds. But he is explicit
regarding the one point that matters here: that transcendence is essential to
natural law and that, therefore, the existence of natural law presupposes the
existence of suprahuman divine powers. This view is not at variance with
scientific value relativism which-rightly interpreted, or reformulated--does
not deny God's existence, but merely insists that it cannot be scientifically
demonstrated, and that, therefore, the existence of an ethical natural law, too,
cannot be scientifically demonstrated, although it can be believed in, speculated
about, and be made the standard of justice in practical life.
ARNOLD BRECHT
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Wolf, op. cit. supra, note 3 at 2.

By Rebecca West. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1957. Pp. 319. $3.75.

COURT AND THE CASTLE.

Miss Rebecca West was invited to deliver at Yale the Dwight Harrington
Terry Foundation Lectures. and The Court and the Castle is, we are told, "based
upon" these lectures. The book discusses a variety of moral, political, and
religious themes as these are treated (in Miss West's view) by a series of imaginative writers, dramatists and novelists, from Shakespeare to Kafka. What Miss
West wishes to do with these themes as they are brought by her under the two
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symbols of the Court and the Castle it is hard to say without giving a very extended account of the book. What she attempts is best, perhaps, given in her
own words as "an enquiry into the use of the public life by writers whose interest
is in the private life." 1 She is interested in statecraft, in social order and disorder, in political morality and in some theological questions (notably Pelagianism,
of which she seems not to approve and which she seems-though this is not
altogether clear-to think can be shown to be a false theory by reflection upon
experience) ; and she examines the works, or some of them, of the writers on her
list in order to find out what they have to say, or what they can be made to
imply, on the topics in which she is interested. Such interest as the book has lies
in the shrewdness and wit of the occasional observations rather than in the
presentation of a general thesis. Insofar as Miss West has a general thesis it is
simply that there "is a tendency of creative literature, when it rises above a certain
level, to involve itself with statecraft and with religion." 2
Miss West is better on some writers than on others. She is very acute about
Trollope (e.g., "[The Barsetshire novels] are really novels about the Civil Service,
furnished with an ecclesiastical background and trappings"); has some good
things to say about Fielding, Henry James, Dorothy Richardson, and Virginia
Woolf and some unexceptionable things to say about Kafka; but gets into a
frightful tangle over Shakespeare, Dickens-the novels she discusses she cannot
have read for years, for she mixes up "the veneerings" (sic) with Alfred Lammle
and Sophronia Akershem and misspells the name of the family in A Christmas
Carol-and Proust.
Where Miss West makes mistakes, as I think she does very frequently throughout the book, she does so through an excessive reliance upon a bold and dogmatic
temperament. This makes itself felt at once.
.. . any authentic work of art must start an argument between the artist and
his audience. The artist creates that work of art by analyzing an experience
and synthesizing the results of3 his analysis into a form which excites an
appetite for further experience.
This is no more than a poor exercise in persuasive definition. The objections to
the "must" and to the confident statement about what the-presumably authentic
-artist does are, one is inclined to think, as evident to Miss West as to anyone else.
She has an interesting hypothesis about Hamlet; but she does not present it as a
hypothesis with strong points and difficulties. On the contrary, "there is nothing
obscure about the content of Hamlet," and the unanimity of those many critics
and readers who find in the character of Hamlet "a symbol of irresolution"Miss West thinks this quite without justification-is termed "remarkable" in
view of the cogency of Miss West's hypothesis. Her abilities as a commentator
on Hamlet may be judged by the way in which she handles particular details.
Concerning Hamlet's interview with Gertrude in which he taxes her with adultery
Miss West writes:
1.
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2. Id. at 305.
3. Id. at 5.
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...He simply tells her that she is behaving reprehensibly in living with her
present husband, not because he had murdered her dead husband and his own
brother, but because he was not so good looking as her dead husband.... His
curious emphasis on the physical difference between the dead King and the
living Claudius hints at a homosexual element in his nature.... 4
Of Laertes' speech upon leaping into Ophelia's grave she writes:
His mind rushes away from the dead girl on too long a journey, all the way to
blue Olympus, and forgets its true grief in the excitement of travel. 5
There is a painful vulgarity in such remarks; and we are not therefore surprised
when Miss West permits herself remarks that are both vulgar and cruel, as when
she tells us that "the not epicene type of actor loves to play Henry the Fifth." 6
Miss West observes with justice that
Criticism which pretends to tell us what was in the conscious mind of an artist
during the act of creation is an enterprise of the same order as ... telling
fortunes by tea-leaf readings. 7
But this is after she has allowed herself to make such remarks as the following,
all of which pretend to a familiarity with Shakespeare's mind, a familiarity that
rests upon the view that what Shakespeare writes in his plays is good evidence
for what he thinks on a number of moral, religious, and political subjects.
[Shakespeare] hated courts.8
.. . what excites Shakespeare in [Hamlet] is the impossibility of conceiving
an action which could justly be termed virtuous, in view of the bias of original
sin.9
It is quite certain that [Shakespeare] wished to present Hamlet as a bad man,
because he twice makes him rejoice at the thought of murdering men who had
not made their peace with God.l0
The treatment of political ideas is from time to time quite baffling. She
writes of Shakespeare that "where he was surely not one with his contemporaries
is in his lack of sympathy with the contractual theory of the English monarchy." 11
But who in Shakespeare's day, apart from some Jesuits and some Puritans (and
these can scarcely be intended by "his contemporaries"), did believe in such a
theory? The infuriating thing is that Miss West knows better, as is evident from
the remarks on p. 66. A rich example of the dense confusion into which Miss
West plunges us when she deals with the history of political ideas is the following
remark, a criticism of Bernard Shaw's Saint Joan:
.. . there is no indication that the shepherdess of Domremy might have been
allowed to listen to her voices, had they not, in a roundabout way, supported
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 61.
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the case of Dante's De Monarchia, and that the Papacy's claim of international
temporal 12power forbade the Church to tolerate independent nationalist
heroines.
What was the case of Dante's De Monarchia, one would like to ask Miss West.
that Joan's voices supported, in however "roundabout" a way?
We have already seen that Miss West has well-marked views on homosexuality
and on what constitutes evidence for latent homosexuality. A very strange thing
happens when she comes to deal with Proust. She greatly admires Proust; but
she argues that because Proust deals so frequently in his novel with homosexual
love, he can have no motive for portraying homosexual love under the guise of
heterosexual love (Miss West has in mind the affair with Albertine, though the
relations of the narrator with Gilberte and with Andr~e are also in question and
ought to have been discussed). A great deal could be said about this. For
example, Proust knows very well how to describe a heterosexual love affair (Swann
and Odette). It would be easy to show from the text of La Prisonni~rethat the
love there depicted is either infantile and auto-erotic (with "Albertine" as the
catalyst) or homosexual. No heterosexual behavior is either described or hinted
at. But Miss West has missed a most obvious clue. "Albertine," "Gilberte,"
"Andre"-in each case we are offered the feminized form of a man's name. If
this were all we had to go upon we could dismiss it, as this form is very common
in France. But the weight of evidence surely goes against Miss West's view. She
should at least produce stronger arguments on the matter than she does.
I have noticed something wrong with the syntax of two of Miss West's
sentences. They are to be found on pp. 103 and 109.
J. M. CAMERON
12.

Id. at 34.
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INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EVOLU-

By Ludwig von Mises.
Pp. 384. $6.00.

New Haven: Yale University Press,

Ludwig von Mises has the reputation of being an obsessed defender of
economic liberalism. The title of the present work roused hopes that the necessity
of dealing with what man can know in history would relax his obsession. The
expectation was vain. Theory and History is all of a piece with Socialism,
Bureaucracy, and Omnipotent Government. This is to say that it is a limited
rather than a broad treatment of its subject. It is exceedingly single-minded
and obsessed. But like its predecessors it also abounds in acute criticism and
challenging observations. Von Mises is the hedgehog about which Isaiah Berlin
has written so well. He knows only one thing, and for him the one thing is
all-important. His limitation, however, is the ground of his strength-for everything is acutely scrutinized in relation to economic liberalism.
His earlier works presented a consistent theme. In them he celebrated
liberalism, a purer liberalism than ever existed except in the writings of some
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classical economists. This liberalism, resting on the sternly uninterrupted play
of the free market, is the sole guarantor of a free society. The unimpeded sway
of supply and demand is the only conceivable rationally organized society. For
rationalism calculation is necessary; and, if man is to calculate and be calculable,
men must act solely from self-interest.
Thus, man must be considered simply as an individual. He recognizes that
man's social life is rather more than the interested cohering of individuals. But
any effort to stress a non-atomic view of society meets his impatient severity. In
his mind such a view brings in all the demons of irrationality, and man must
be rational in the author's manner or freedom farewell. The reason advanced
for this insistence is that society has but precariously triumphed over the struggle
for existence. Man may indulge in social cooperation and enjoy his hardly won
reprieve from the Darwinian free-for-all--or, more accurately, free for the
strong-if he carefully fosters the sources of modern productivity, the division of
labor, specialization of tasks, and the free market. Where these are interfered
with, no matter the grounds or the ends, the result leads to tyranny, which he
defines as the attempt to do the impossible.
Von Mises is an enthusiast of freedom. His limited conception of freedom,
however, makes him the critic of every modern state, though he might exempt
contemporary Germany. His Central European background weighs heavily on
him. There, so he argued in Bureaucracy (1944), government carried a prestige,
destructive of rationalism and liberty. In his definition bureaucracy is a matter
not of size but of the absence of economic calculation., Bureaucracy replaces
the rational choice of the consumer and the rational decision of the producer by
the decision of political power and intrigue for political power.
Louis Brownlow entitled his autobiography, A Passion for Politics. Von
Mises might properly entitle his own, A Passion against Politics. This passion,
which has, also, characterized a small number of Americans who proclaim themselves Jeffersonian democrats, has inspired von Mises to make incisive analyses
of European bureaucracies. To him socialism means the negation of the market
and the creation of the incalculable and irrational power that tempts its wielders
to romantic crusades and suicidal folly. He extends this condemnation to all
forms of state intervention in economic life including Keynesianism. He has
insisted not only that state intervention in the depression to relieve unemployment
was self-defeating but that the free play of the market would have finally removed
unemployment without intolerable hardship. Von Mises is doctrinaire and
courageous enough to have said this in 1931-1933, but very few of those living in
that period would then have shared his confidence or agreed with his notion of
the intolerable. As a doctrinaire, he simply prescribes his teaching, although it
is irrelevant to the conditions in which man then had to live. Tariffs and
restrictions on immigration also receive his condemnation. These, too, breed
irrationality and bureaucracy, and these make for war. At the end of World
War II he expressed his belief that the victorious democracies, committed as they
were to interventionist policies, would precipitate war. Of course, he can explain
the latter developments as the product of the monstrous interventionism of the
Soviet Union. He can explain everything, and he is not wholly wrong. But he
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is spectacularly irrelevant to the needs of men who want to live through the
next decade.
His indictment of Marxism finally leads to the basis of his thought. A major
count is that the Marxists by emphasizing that social views are merely the projection of class interest deny the universal validity of the reasoning process. This
is the only certain universal. Values and ends are ultimately exempt from the
scrutiny of reason. Reason is universal but values are variable. Values and
ends cannot be proved in any scientific or rational way. The reasoning process,
however, can demonstrate that a particular choice of means will not serve the
intended end. It may reveal the means as productive of the most undesirable
consequences. Thus, economics, he insists, can point out to the socialist and
interventionist the disastrous consequences of their means. Failure to understand
the inevitable results of such policies has been responsible for the pervasive
collectivism of modem thought. To this development, positivists, moralists, as
well as socialists, have contributed. Indeed, modem intellectual history is presented as a great conspiracy against liberal economics and its later perfection
by the marginal utility school. Positivism's sin consisted in refusing to recognize
the laws of economics and in embarking on an allegedly scientific quest that
sanctioned tyranny, that is, the impossible. Most studies of group behavior and
mass phenomena work to the same end.
His starting point is that man acts and that the end of his action is purposeful.
You cannot dictate ends to man, but reasoning can discuss the adequacy of his
means. Psychology as developed in the eighteenth century established that man
will seek his interest, and this will include his material well-being. Any moral
criticism about the dangers of acquisitiveness and avarice rouses his severest
criticism. Such attempts are the confounding work characteristic of "historicists,"
among whom he includes the economic historian and Christian socialist, R. H.
Tawney, for attempting to discredit "economic appetites. After all it was nature,
not the capitalists, that implanted appetites in man and impels him to satisfy
them." 1 Do these people, he asks, really prefer infant mortality to the fulfillment
of natural appetites? Must these people lament the passing of a tradition which
flourished with its inevitable accompaniment, "famines, plagues, wars, the
persecution of heretics, and other disasters"?
The tone is eighteenth century, and not by accident. One sentence provides
the keynote: "Utilitarianism finally completed' the intellectual evolution inaugurated by the Greek Sophists." 2 The finest product of Utilitarianism is
economics. As justice in jurisprudence refers only to laws as they are, so economics deals with laws as they are. Ethics cannot call for intervention in
economic life, for to do so is ruinous, and "the precepts of ethics are designed
to preserve, not to destroy the world." 3 In this discussion the author finally
reveals his extreme individualism. He deals with society as though it were solely
1.

LUDWIG YON MisEs, THEORY AND HISTORY: AN

EcoNoMrc

2.
3.

EVOLUTION 238.

Id. at 49.
Id. at 55, 57.

INTERPRETATION

OF SOCIAL AND

NATURAL LAW FORUM
something formed by human will for securing ends "which men want to attain
by social cooperation." To repeat an old joke about the Epicureans, society is
not what the atomists crack it up to be. Society is more fundamental, natural,
and inescapable. Here, von Mises' individualism brings him close to his definition of tyranny-the impossible.
Social utility, then, is the only standard of justice and the sole guide of
legislation. "There is no such thing as a normative science, a science of what
ought to be." 4 As there is no way of eliminating conflicting judgments of value,
Utilitarianism has its triumph, for it "does not deal at all with ultimate ends
and judgments of value. It invariably refers only to means." With social utility
as the sole principle, there is no longer any fundamental conflict between altruism
and selfishness, ethics and economics, and the concerns of society and the
individual. These apparent antagonisms become simply "the oppositions of shortrun and long-run interests." 5 The waxed body of Jeremy Bentham, seated on a
chair in the Senior Common Room of University College, London, has the fate
of all philosophers-Bentham now has a disciple who is more Benthamite than
the master.
There are echoes here of Adam Smith's invisible hand and Hegel's "cunning
of reason," although von Mises does not explicitly recognize them. In the sphere
of economic appetites, calculation produces harmony; but calculation cannot
operate in other fields. Because of his eighteenth century ancestry, and his belief
in the harmony of interests, von Mises might be expected to deal with natural
law. He treats it but in subordination to the apotheosis of Utilitarianism.
In his eyes the natural law tradition yields only a bewildering diversity of
doctrines. This is just enough as a historical judgment. But the sequel is
astonishing, for he lists the following three "theorems" as the legacy of the natural
law tradition: the idea of a natural order to which man must adjust his actions,
if they are to be successful; this order may be known only by reasoning, which
exempts no institution from its critical scrutiny; the standard by which actions
are to be judged can only be that of the effects produced by such action. To the
credit of natural law is its rejection of legal positivism. But, perniciously, the
doctrine abstracted and supplanted the teachings of liberal social philosophy. For
example, it preached the biological equality of all men. In so outraging nature
the tradition of natural law finally caused wars, nationalism, and racism.
Here, it is finally necessary to interject the single word-nonsense. This
reviewer has severely held himself to the task of clarifying the thought of a writer
with whom he rarely agrees, and never wholeheartedly. Von Mises' knowledge
of history is strangely old-fashioned, as might be expected from his Benthamism.
He adds little to the subject of his book, Theory and History, apart from the
recognition that history is not a science but an inquiry which must proceed in the
examination of evidence by means of logic, with a knowledge of psychology, not
the science of the physiologists and behaviorists but of the human spirit. The
historian must, also, know the universally valid laws of economics. To fail to do
4. Id. at 55.
5. Id. at 49, 55.
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so is to compound human error and to yield to historicism. Where Acton was
a hanging judge of historical actions in the name of morality, von Mises is a
hanging judge in the name of liberal economics. The book is a lesson in the
primacy of that discipline, and a warning to historians to respect it.
In sum, he is a hedgehog. His extremism and more than occasional penchant
for nonsense contribute to discredit him, and, more seriously, the position he
advocates. His economic position has been argued far more plausibly and
humanely by Hayek, and some reviewers have unscrupulously pretended to deal
with Hayek when they were refuting von Mises.
But the hedgehog, as a defender of freedom, makes many good points. He is
merciless with historicists, positivists, and believers in historical cycles. He scores
on philosophers of the history of civilization who glibly contemplate the universals
of civilization, when, as yet, no one has been able to define and comprehend
what a civilization is, or, as a matter of history, describe the life course of a
civilization. He rightly criticizes all those who would imprison man's future in
the dungeons of their speculative patterns. This is no small service, when history
and the philosophy of history face the terrible temptation of intruding upon
philosophy and theology to usurp the functions which the latter in their parlous
condition so poorly discharge. Historians, it may be hoped, will be sufficiently
good philosophers as well as historians to resist the temptation.
M. A. FITZSIMONS
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No. 10. By Klaus Ritter. Witten-Ruhr: Luther-Verlag, 1956. Pp. 128.
DM. 5.80.
The chief motivation of this short but very thoughtful study is indicated in
its subtitle: "An epistemological discussion of recent attempts to restore a metaphysics of law." The author seeks for an unshakeable foundation of law which
would resolve the conflict between natural law and legal positivism. According
to Ritter the conflict arises out of an antinomy grounded in the very structure of
systematic discursive reasoning based upon the complete separation of subject
and object. As long as this basis is not abandoned, reason will be forced into
extrarational commitments or into skepticism. Thus the solution of the antinomy
is not to be found in a decision in favor of natural law (the extrarational commitment) or of legal positivism (skepticism), but in the ascertainment of a new
starting point.
The author concedes ab initio the invalidity of legal positivism. To prove his
thesis about natural law he examines various natural law theories advanced in
Germany since 1945. A sifting of the literature demonstrates that the renascence
of natural law is more apparent than real, since the term natural law is used
loosely. Ritter discusses briefly the views of Mitteis, von Kempski, W. G. Becker,
and Erbe and the last works of Radbruch, and notes that their proposals, while
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tending towards the natural law, are insufficient for its restoration. The true
natural law doctrines are treated under the headings of Christian natural law
(divided into Catholic and Protestant positions) and profane natural law. These
three positions are represented respectively by Heinrich Rommen (whom the
author mistakes to the credit of the Order for a Jesuit), Emil Brunner, and
Helmut Coing.
In his searching analysis Ritter is guided by his philosophical (quasi-Kantian,
quasi-existentialist) and Protestant theological (Barthian) commitments which
permit him to assert neither the possibility of a valid cognition of metaphysical
realities nor the possibility of a valid natural theology.
The author takes Rommen's treatise on the natural law as a classic statement
of the Roman Catholic position. While admiring the steadfastness with which
the Church has clung to the natural law theory, he objects to the metaphysical
realism implied in the Catholic doctrine and argues in accordance with his
theological premises that Catholic thought attaches far too little importance to
the debilitating effect of original sin. Ritter maintains with Kant that absolutely
valid principles must 'be proven without reference to their empirical content and
claims that the principia communissima incapable of other than empirical proof
must be denied universal validity. Another objection is independent of the author's
premises and, therefore, of special value. He points out that the universal validity
of the general principles cannot be preserved without general rules which
determine the application of basic principles to circumstances. General principles
of application, however, are not provided by the Catholic natural law theory, so
that in actuality the application of the basic principles involves their modification. Thus accommodation to circumstances denotes the use of ad hoc assumptions rather than the consistent use of universal principles. Ritter concludes,
therefore, that the customary view of positive law as a concrete interpretation of
natural law is incapable of substantiation. It is evident that Ritter in his critique
has touched upon several points which are also of grave concern to wholehearted
admirers of the jus naturalis.
In the beginning of his discussion of Brunner's teaching Ritter notes that a
Christian natural law presupposes a clarification of the relationship obtaining
between reason and revelation. In the course of his analysis of Brunner's thinking
it becomes evident that in Ritter's eyes Brunner has not succeeded, and that his
position is contradictory. Because of his theological standpoint Brunner is judged
to be less one-sided in his approach than Catholic thinkers. He denies that human
reason can furnish a natural theology, but holds that reason can achieve a valid
cognition of nature and therefore construct a natural law. Ritter points out,
however, that Brunner's position entails defects similar to those noted in the
Catholic natural law doctrine. Ritter objects to Brunner's rationalist tendencies,
to the absence of a nexus between principles and practice, and concludes that
Brunner's norms derive ultimately from his religious convictions and not from the
natural order of things. It might be open to question whether Ritter with his
admitted preference for the theology of Barth displays all requisite empathy for
Brunner's very subtle reasoning.
Helmut Coing's work, representative of the profane natural law theory, is the
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subject of the author's most detailed and searching criticism. By analyzing Coing's
express and implied assumptions Ritter demonstrates that Coing's work is more
facile than profound. Coing claims as foundations for his doctrine valid insight
into the "a priori realm of values" (Hartmann), given in the intuition of feelings
and the constancy of social problems. Both together result in legal principles
which have transsubjective and extratemporal validity. Ritter points out that
the empirical fact of values does not prove their universality but only their
existence. In the opinion of Ritter, Coing weakens his own case in several
instances. For one thing, he has no answer to his own question whether we can
be certain of the objective and absolute character of values perceived. Besides,
while Coing's doctrine of supplementary values points to the interconnectedness
of values (Hartmann), he attempts a determination neither of values nor of their
respective rank. Ritter notes that any such attempt is foredoomed to failure
because of Hartmann's methodological aporia of order, i.e., values cannot be
ordered without a scale, and no scale can be constructed without ordered values.
Nevertheless, Coing attempts to develop the content of justice from the insight
into the ethical value of personality. Ritter points out that Coing's reasoning
breaks down when he maintains that social inequality cannot be determined by
any standard of justice, since the value of a person cannot be measured. Coing's
argument implies not only a commingling of commutative and distributive
justice, but also an abandonment of the erstwhile claimed uniqueness of the
person. Ritter also makes it clear that Coing's concept of personal value is
unclear and contradictory. For if the ethical value of the person be wholly
transcendent to experience, it cannot serve as a foundation of empirical law; if it
be empirical, it cannot be constitutive of universally valid principles. Coing's
use of the ethical value of personality is also open to doubt since he is unable to
provide any positive prescriptions for the ethical will. If the interconnectedness
of all values be admitted, Coing's assertions that we progressively discover the
natural law is tantamount to saying that we do not know the natural law, since
partial knowledge of values cannot render an order of preferences. Moreover,
Coing himself denies that his own natural law possesses absolute and metaphysical
significance. Hence Ritter is fully entitled to doubt that Coing has succeeded in
providing a foundation for the natural law. Included in Ritter's treatment of
Coing's position is a very rewarding discussion of some fundamental aspects of
N. Hartmann's position. The author doubts the fruitfulness of the phenomenological approach in general since in his view it avoids the problem of absolute
truth and leads to a practical realism. This reviewer holds that the phenomenological approach is not as unsuitable as Ritter thinks.
Ritter concludes that the natural law is an impossibility. No valid connections
exist between absolute principles and contingent circumstances, and the epistemological presuppositions of any absolutely valid law cannot be substantiated. Nor
can any attempt to ground natural law in the structure of the human person
succeed. Ritter, in agreement with H. Bliiher and K. Barth, holds that personality is neither a philosophical object, nor the autonomous subject of a moral
world, nor a clearly discernible image of the Divinity, but a reciprocal relationship
of free beings.
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The classic ideal of philosophy, namely, objective absolute truth independent
of the thinking subject, must be abandoned altogether. For, according to Ritter,
philosophical realism, which has become doubtful since Kant, has been shown to
be untenable by the philosophical conclusions that von Weitzsdcker draws from the
principle of indeterminacy. Instead, Ritter suggests, we must find the source
both of human value and of knowledge in man's continuous and deliberate openness to the unconditioned ground of existence-God. Ritter envisages a philosophy of existential commitment which demonstrates in its very structure the
ultimate unity of faith and knowledge. In the opinion of the reviewer a consideration of von Laun's work might have been useful to the author.
This very penetrating and thorough study by Ritter cbnstitutes a real contribution to the clarification of some of the problematics inherent in natural law.
Differences in approach and of conviction should not deter anyone from reading
this book.
ULRICH S.
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It is not easy to see why, after seventeen major and minor works of Del
Vecchio's have been translated into English, another should have been singled out
for the difficult labor of expert translation into English and separate publication.
The work chosen is an introduction to a course on philosophy of law, read in
December 1920 at the University of Rome. It is reproduced unchanged, except
for bracketed references to new Italian legislation, especially the Codice Civile
of 1942 insofar as it has superseded the references in the original.
This lecture falls towards the end of Del Vecchio's Neo-Kantian period, from
which his most important work dates. It was not much later that, like so many
other Continental jurists, Del Vecchio sought intellectual justification for the
Italian Fascist regime, of which he became an ardent supporter, by gradually
sliding from a Neo-Kantian into a Neo-Hegelian philosophy. No other philosophy,
of course, lends itself so easily to glorification of absolute state power, and the
suppression of any opposing rights or values - under the cover of moralizing
phrases - as Hegelianism. It is not, therefore, entirely without a sense of irony
that anybody who has followed the course of Del Vecchio's work, will read the
present lecture, which staunchly upholds the "Law-state," i.e., an irreducible
minimum of individual rights against the power of the State. Philosophically,
this lecture makes two major points, which are not necessarily correlated. One
is that a legal system, however completely codified, is not analytically self-contained, that it must be interpreted and developed creatively by reference to the
basic ideas and values that underlie the legal system as a whole. This is expressed
specifically in some modem codifications such as the Swiss Civil Code. But it
has come to be accepted as a matter of course in the legal philosophy and judicial
practice of all the great civilian systems (as, indeed, from very different premises
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in the common law jurisdictions). Such an approach, which is no longer novel
or original, does not necessarily lead to a natural law philosophy. Nobody has
been more insistent on the necessity of articulating the ultimate values inherent
in any legal and social order than the great relativists such as Max Weber or
Gustav Radbruch (or, we might add, from very different premises, Oliver
Wendell Holmes).
Del Vecchio couples with this necessity to supplement the logical and analogical interpretation of a codified law by reference to what has now, in the
parlance of the Statute for the International Court of Justice, become the wellknown phrase of "general principles of law recognized among civilized nations,"
with an appeal to natural law as a guide to such principles. His attempt to spell
out these basic principles of natural law remains somewhat vague. The basic
ideal is respect for the human being as a personality. From this follow three
principles: the concept of the sovereignty of the law; the concept of equality
before the law for all; and the concept of separation of powers, as a further
insurance of the supremacy of the law against the other activities of the State.
Strangely enough, a relatively minor problem, not much discussed in the common
law, the right to one's portrait, occupies a considerable amount of Del Vecchio's
discussion of the rights of personality. Freedom of contract and, subject to the
limitation of abuse of rights, the right of property are added to the list.
Today all this sounds a trifle stale, a criticism not so much of what Del
Vecchio had to say in 1920 as of the choice of this lecture for publication in
English in 1956. Whether we believe in natural law or not, we have, since,
been faced with problems of overwhelmingly greater magnitude and difficulty.
At what point can we agree - as Radbruch suggested in his writings after
the Second World War - that a positive law is "non-law" because of its monstrosity? We probably all agree that the Nazi orders, decreeing the extermination
of millions of Jews and others in gas ovens and concentration camps, should not
be recognized as law - provided always that the regime is overthrown and
another order permits judgment upon it. We hardly need to appeal to natural
law to condemn and punish those responsible for such unspeakable barbarities.
The real problem arises with the underlings: those who are placed before the
dilemma of either assisting in the preparation and the execution of immoral
laws, or risking severe penalties for disobedience. The generals leading armies
to aggression; civil servants preparing concentration camp orders; soldiers killing
women and children under orders of their superiors who will shoot them for
disobedience; the choice between the sacrifice of the life of a mother, perhaps
the center of a large family, or the preservation of a small embryo-these
and a hundred other problems cry out for solution, by natural law or any other
code of values.
But it is precisely in this kind of problem that general precepts such as those
indicated in the present little book take us nowhere. For under the cover of the
right of personality, the rule of law, or liberty of contract, subject to the interests,
of the community, all sorts of conflicting solutions are possible. Hundreds of
books and articles have been written, not excluding Declarations of Human
Rights, setting forth eloquently the basic and immutable principles. But very
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few go down to the agonizing details of problems where there is a choice
between conflicting values, loyalties, ideas, duties, each of which has a claim to
recognition. It is only in the concreteness of the individual case that the dilemma
of natural law emerges. Does natural law command - as we are taught by the
Neo-Scholastic doctrine - that any form of birth control, other than by the use
of the calendar, is contrary to the natural order of creation, even if the consequence of this doctrine in our age of improved hygiene is that the population
of the earth will teem with millions of human beings living in animal-like
conditions, mere shadows of the human dignity which also is a postulate of
natural law? Does it command us to deprive a family of wife and mother, so
that a yet unborn child in the womb may not die unbaptized? Does it command
the civil servant to refuse assistance in the preparation of an immoral law at
the risk of imprisonment? (To say that it does, is, of course, infinitely easier
after the order has been overthrown and judgment can be pronounced by those
who did not have to face the dilemma.)
My own answer to many of these problems often differs from that of the
natural law philosophers. This does not mean that I consider their belief wrong
and mine right. But the claim of those who hold a contrary belief, to speak in
the name of absolute truth, although millions of people differ on these questions
of grave ethical dilemmas, appears to this reviewer as an example of human
arrogance clothed in supernatural wisdom. I also reject the totally false antithesis
between adherence to natural law philosophy and adherence to a skeptical,
nihilistic positivism, which knows no values. For the same reason, I reject the
assumption - made in Del Vecchio's lecture - that the need to search for
principles beyond the text of the code means, necessarily, the acceptance of
natural law.
We salute Professor Del Vecchio's lecture, and particularly Judge Forte's
careful and able translation, with respect. But we emerge from the reading not
much nearer to the solution of the agonizing problems of contemporary law
than before.
WOLFGANG
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Professor Maritain's philosophy of history shows promise of being an important
step in the resolution of the problem posed for all natural law systems by the
variability of the human condition. The demand for a jurisprudence addressed
to the existential situation has long been the source of the most telling objection
to all such systems. The idealist-rationalist version of natural law, with its claim
to derive all the detailed precepts of human law from the essential qualities of
human nature, has been wholly discredited under the force of this demand, while
the Neo-Scholastic school of natural law, by confining itself to those principles
that can be asserted as applicable to all men everywhere, has given up any possible
claim to being a methodologically adequate system of jurisprudence.
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The Neo-Scholastic, with his long experience in formulating and applying
universally applicable principles of morality, has been able to assert with commendable forcefulness the primacy of the moral order over the legal order. In
the vast areas of the law, however, where he can discern no unequivocal moral
principle immediately involved, he has been content to leave the field to the
positivist. Even in areas where his moral commitments are heavily involved, he
is apt to use them to carp at the positive law, rather than to shape it.
What the Neo-Scholastic natural law theorist has in common with the
positivist is a blithe disregard for the problems of legal methodology. Methodological questions can 'be meaningful only when there is something to achieve
and limited resources with which to achieve it. The positivist by his doctrine
excludes the first of these requirements; the Neo-Scholastic by reason of his lack
of concern for the existential situation takes no notice of the other.
The most important attempt to introduce an existential element into a natural
law framework has been through the concept of freedom. The natural law
itself, it is argued, provides for the variations in the human condition by requiring
that each person be left free to do as he thinks best, except insofar as he is
restrained by the demands of a like freedom for another, or by the demands of
some principle binding on all mankind. Both the rationalist-idealist and the
Neo-Scholastic have included some such principle in their theories of natural law.
This, however, while it is not without methodological consequences, is fundamentally a teleological principle-a value the law should achieve. Adherence to
it makes the methodological inadequacy less harmful, but does not make the
methodology less inadequate. Whatever universally binding principle the law
attempts to recognize, including freedom itself, cannot be secured without the
exercise of a good deal of methodological sophistication. In any given time and
place, the way in which the principle is being applied, and the forces arrayed
against it, must be carefully considered if the principle is to be secured by law.
For an adequate methodology, then, we need not so much an existential
understanding of the human person as an existential understanding of the social
context. The fact that human beings are unique, and not interchangeable, is of
vital import, but it does not wholly account for the variability of the human
condition. The external conditions of human life, both natural and societal, are
also capable of variation. The conditions produced by these variations are neither
unique to the individual nor common to mankind. The law must deal with
them, and cannot deal with them under principles of universal validity.
It is this that has led the school of jurisprudence called sociological to substitute for the value element in law a sociological element empirically determined.
This use of mores or some such criterion has avoided the most telling methodological objection to analytical positivism-that the analysis of legal norms divorced
from their social contexts simply does not yield results. At the same time, the
philosophical objection to positivism is just as applicable to the doctrines of the
sociological school. For anyone who insists on philosophical grounds that there
must be an ethical element in legal determinations, mores as such cannot constitute an adequate substitute. Methodologically, there is the further objection
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that the mores of a given society are ambivalent, so that valid results require a
selection between conflicting standards with equal claim to a foundation in the
mores of the society, and therefore require a principle of selection. This has been
rather apparent in our own society recently in problems of race relations and in
problems of obscene literature. It is no accident that the development of
empirical techniques for clarifying the actual mores has coincided with a judicial
retreat from the use of mores as a standard for legal choice.
T!he philosophy of history seems to furnish a key to the problem presented
by these countervailing and inadequate doctrines of law, the one insufficiently
conscious of the contingent factors in the legal determination, the other insufficiently conscious of the ultimate teleological factors. The philosophy of
history aims at making what is transitory intelligible in the light of what is
ultimate. Thus, it is capable of making law intelligible as a totality-that is,
with respect to its total function of giving practical social content to an ethical
aspiration.
The Hegelian dialectic, with which the term "philosophy of history" is usually
associated in modern times, does indeed, in form, make law intelligible as a totality.
Unlike the doctrines thus far considered, it gives rise to a jurisprudence open to
no methodological objections; it will yield a principle of selection that is applicable
to every case, is not ambivalent, and is not irrelevant to the actual conditions of
society. It can be objected to, therefore, only on philosophical grounds. For
anyone interested in the ethical considerations recognized by natural law theories,
these philosophical grounds are not hard to find. Both in the Hegelian system
and in its Marxian modification, there is no ultimate value outside the dialectic
toward which the law can aim. Thus, each of the great dialectical movements
in history comes equipped with a whole intellectual and social apparatus of its
own, including its own jurisprudence. This is especially clear in the case of
Marxism, which attributes to each of the conflicting social classes in history its
own system of law, calculated to keep it in power. This imprisonment of law
within the confines of the dialectic is, of course, wholly inconsistent with the
aspiration toward justice for all men that is the mainspring of natural law
thinking.
Maritain corrects the Hegelian insight by examining history in terms of a
commitment to ultimate principles outside history. The way he accomplishes this
is perhaps best summed up in his remark that "we are not cooperators with
history: we are cooperators with God." 1 Maritain insists on the historical
significance of free human acts-acts intelligible only with reference to an aspiration that does not emanate from history. From the interaction between human
freedom and the more or less determined forces of history, he derives his basic
doctrine, which is that although history may dictate the necessity for certain
changes, the changes themselves can be made either well or badly, depending on
the extent to which the human agents that bring it about discern and pursue the
extrahistorical good. Maritain gives as an example "the implications of scientific,
industrial and technological progress":
1.
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It is obvious that the passing of humanity under a technological regime is
something necessary; it cannot be avoided. But in what spirit, in what
manner? In such a way that man is made subservient to the machine and
to technique, or in such a way that technique and technology are made instruments of human freedom? The same change can come about in an enslaving
and degrading manner, or in a genuinely rational and liberating manner. And
that does not depend on any necessity in history, but on the way in which
man intervenes ...

2

We may also consider profitably how much free human acts are affecting
today the answer to the still open question of whether the inevitable transition
of the nations of Asia and Africa from colonial status to independence will be
peaceful or violent, whether it will produce responsible and stable new nations or
bitter and disorderly new nations.
Looking at history in the light of this fundamental principle of the interplay
of historical necessity and free choice, Maritain discerns six principles which he
calis "axiomatic formulas or functional laws." These principles can be grouped
for our purposes under three heads. The first deals with the scope of the
historical context, the second with the scope of free choice in history, and the
third with the effect of free choice in history.
Under the first head belongs what Maritain calls the "law of the world
significance of history-making events." According to this principle, an event that
fixes the mode of a historical change in a given place conditions to a greater or
less extent the mode of that change everywhere. Good and evil, to put it another
way, will play out their hands in other times and places, but never with quite the
same cards again. We can perhaps see this law in operation in the extent to
which the social reform that has gone on in non-Communist countries since the
Russian revolution has been conceived in terms of answering Marxist criticism
or of staving off Marxist-inspired revolution, as well as the extent to which
Russian Communism has had to revise its own techniques of expansion to cope
with the conditions set up by these social changes. But this and any other
obvious example are too much dependent on modem conditions of communication to do full justice to the intuition Maritain is attempting to formulate in
this law. As he says:
I am sorry I did not arrive at any satisfactory formulation, though, given the
modem network of economic, intellectual and political communications,
encompassing all peoples, such a concept, so far as it is equivalent to that of
universal interrelation, may obviously be translated into quite rational terms.
Yet I was thinking of a more vital and secret kind of solidarity, as old as
mankind is ....
The importance for our purposes of the law in question lies in what follows
from it as to the existential quality of the historical context. If all historical
changes are made for all history, no two historical contexts can be alike. Thus,
the intelligibility of history is not that of a number of things displaying essential
2. Id. at 25-26.
3. Id. at 63.
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similarities but that of one thing changing. It is through awareness of this form
of intelligibility that a philosophy of history cognizant of the extrahistorical nature
of human aspiration may be able to meet the demand for a jurisprudence addressed to the existential situation, and still preserve the essential elements insisted on by the best traditions of the natural law.
Under the second head, that of principles dealing with the scope of free
choice in history, come three laws Maritain calls those of "two-fold contrasting
progress," of "the ambivalence of history" and of "prise de conscience." The
first of these refers to the fact that as time goes on the possibilities for good and
evil are realized more and more. The metaphysical explanation Maritain
advances for this law seems equally consistent with either a cyclic or a lineal
pattern. It is that on the one hand the passivity of matter is continually dissipating the creative forces at work in history, while on the other hand these forces are
,continually being renewed from the inherent creativity of the human spirit. That
the pattern is lineal and not cyclic is perhaps attributable to the concomitant,
more or less irreversible, process whereby more and more knowledge and technique
capable of being put to either good or evil use is piling up in the hands of fallible
human beings who sometimes do good and sometimes do evil. Although Maritain does not expressly refer to this process of accumulating knowledge in his
elucidation of the twofold contrasting progress, the examples he chooses seem to
indicate that he is aware of its significance.
The law of the ambivalence of history Maritain derives from that of the
twofold contrasting progress. In a given period of history, and, it would seem,
in a given historical impetus, both good and evil are to be discerned. It is this
principle that bears most directly on the scope for free human acts in an area
such as law that is productive of historical events. The forces for change in
history are neither to be resisted as such nor to be accepted as such. They are to
be worked upon and purified.
On the moral and philosophical plane, Maritain alludes to an irreversible
process analogous to that of the accumulation of empirical knowledge, when he
states his law of prise de conscience. "This," he says, "is the law of growth in
awareness as a sign of human progress, and as involving at the same time inherent
dangers." 4 By way of example, he refers to the development in politics of the
awareness of "the spiritual inner freedom of the human person with respect to
the city" and to the development in philosophy with Kant of the awareness of the
theory of knowledge as a special discipline. In a later chapter on "typological
formulas or vectoral laws" Maritain states a "law of the progress of moral conscience," which seems to be a particularization in the sphere of morality of this
same law of prise de conscience. By this he understands not that we do better and
better, but that we understand better and better what we ought to do. The examples of this should be familiar to most of us. Maritain refers to our ideas of
slavery, of the treatment of prisoners of war, of the treatment of workers, and
of the relation between superior and subject. Racial segregation furnishes an
example closer to home for most of us.
4.

Id. at 69.
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Maritain fills out his discussion of the progress of moral conscience by pointing out the dependence of moral philosophy on moral experience. This is not to
say that he denies the proper techniques of moral philosophy as a theoretical
discipline. But he does point out that the determinations of moral philosophy,
unlike those of metaphysics, are open to criticism from the untutored judgment
of good men. Thus, a popular awareness arising from experience may send the
moral philosopher back to run through his theoretical operations all over again.
The progress of moral conscience, then, does not deny the validity of moral
philosophy, but may serve as a corrective on particular applications of the
philosophical technique. This should be considered in the light of the conviction
that seems to be implicit in a good deal of Maritain's thinking that the forces of
history are in some respects moral forces. It is by reason of this moral element
that we can gain through the contemplation of history in its ambivalence a new
awareness of what ought to be.
This whole second group of principles can free the law from its imprisonment
within the dialectics of history, without detracting from the proper place of the
dialectic insight. Maritain affirms the dialectic insight in these terms:
Admittedly, if we consider the manner in which these historical ideas are at
play in history, it can be said that each one of them, each one of these forms
immanent in time, can reach its final accomplishment in time only by provoking its opposite, and denying itself. But why is this so? It is because its
very triumph exhausts the potentialities which summoned it, and at the same
stroke unmasks and provokes in the abyss of the real the opposite potentialities.
Here is an interpretation which has nothing to do with the dialectical alienation and reintegration, but which shows, it seems to me, that history offered
Hegel a kind of material which was akin to his general philosophy. 5
The dialectic thus conceived, considered in the light of the principles thus far
stated, can indicate a function for law. On the one hand, we see good and evil
as fellow-travelers in the movements of the dialectic; on the other we see an
ever-increasing store of experience and sophistication that continually enhances the
potentialities for both. What is important in this is that since the movement of
the dialectic is not between good and evil but from one ambivalent condition to
another, the quantum of good or evil in a given historical context is freely and
not historically determined. It is always open, therefore, for the law, as a free
determination with historical consequences, to digest the new potentialities offered
by a given advance in awareness or technique, and to enhance the good and
reduce the evil in the coming historical context.
Under the last head come the two principles that deal with the manner in
which effects are achieved in history, and therefore can be used to position the
part played in history by the "rule of law." The first of these principles Maritain
calls the "law of the hierarchy of means." Here, he is suggesting that the real
changes in history are elicited more surely by spiritual means than 1y carnal
means, and by humble temporal means (moyens pauvres) than by rich temporal
means (moyens riches); in other words, that men are more surely moved by
5. Id. at 21.
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that which moves the heart than they are by bodily coercion. This is in a way
reminiscent of the historical school of jurisprudence, with its theory that law is
an emanation of the popular spirit. Maritain is careful, however, to disclaim any
interpretation that would give comfort to those who reduce law to no more than
such an emanation. That the use of temporal power is less effective than other
things does not mean that it is of no effect, or should be abandoned. What seems
for our purposes the most important function of this principle is the support it
gives to the view that even in the order of expediency the rule of law need not
be subordinated to its own preservation. The law can pursue justice at the cost of
undermining its own power, with a solid hope that the sacrifice will not be in vain.
This we shall have to consider again.
The other law in this third group, Maritain calls that "of the historical
fructifications of good and evil." By this he means not that the good prosper, but
that what is done well in history is done more successfully than what is done
badly. This seems to accord with a long-standing jural experience that justice
is more stable than injustice. For truth seems to produce a certain equilibrium in
things, whereas error begets antithetical error. It is a rather shrewd insight in
Orwell's 1984 that makes rebellion against the suppression of the human personality take the form of sexual license. The bourgeois society of the last century
gave rise to a somewhat similar reaction.
Let us consider how the significance of the rule of law is clarified by what
this principle implies as to the relation between stability and justice. Let us take
for an example the change which an extremely astute Marxian regards as the
latest movement in the dialectic, and see how the rule of law has affected the
impact of this change on our own society. Milovan Djilas, in The New Class,
suggests that with the triumph of the proletariat over capitalism there arises a new
class of bureaucrats, who grow up out of the need of the proletariat for a machinery to achieve the goals it has set itself. Our own experience, as well as a
growing body of literature, shows us that our own society has not been immune to
this change. The popular demand for a mitigation of the evils of untrammeled
capitalism has brought to the fore a whole body of administrators-in government,
in labor, in business itself-who begin to develop more and more similarity to
each other, less and less to those whose interests they represent.
With the need for representation of groups too large to represent themselves,
it was inevitable that some such class should arise. But it can scarcely be doubted
that in our own society we have been able to realize more of the potentialities for
good and fewer of the potentialities for evil inherent in this historical development
than has been the case with the Communist nations. This might not have
happened; it has been argued that but for the reforms instituted during the first
years of Roosevelt's administration the necessary changes would have come about
through a revolution. Such a revolution would presumably have led to a form
of bureaucratization more like the Communist form than like the one that actually
developed in our country.
The human free choice to which we can attribute the comparatively felicitous
form this development has taken among us was motivated, however, not by a
desire' to prevent a revolution, but by a growing conviction that objective justice
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required certain reforms. That this conviction was given legal and political effect
without any general disruption of our legal and political institutions is attributable
to our commitment to the rule of law. This in turn postulates that there is in
our institutions a certain orientation toward justice as such that enables them to
absorb any new awareness of what is just, and therefore to accomplish the historically necessary changes while maintaining the basic institutional structure intact.
In a society that lacks this commitment to justice institutionalized in the rule
of law, the Marxian dialectic tends to become self-validating. Those who deny
the possibility of a just solution fail, not unnaturally, to reach one. Thus, the
error in every period of history is overcompensated in the next. As we have seen,
there is running through Maritain's doctrine the premise that a certain turning
toward justice is to be found in the great movements of history; thus, he says that
"the yearning for [social justice] among the masses was the real incentive [the
Communist revolution] traded upon." 6 In this blind indignation that throws
down Adam Smith and raises Lenin in his place, there is something reminiscent
of Cahn's "sense of injustice." With no articulated principle of justice to hold
down the force of the emotional response to years of a given injustice, society
cannot but overcompensate, create a countervailing injustice, and set the process
in motion all over again.
One cannot examine the relation between stability and justice in the light of
Maritain's vision of good and evil at work in history without seeing new importance in Cahn's basic intuition of the sense of injustice, and at the same time realizing the limitations on Cahn's formulation. It is no doubt very largely this negative
force that shapes the important movements of history; at the same time, a rational
investigation of exactly what it is that invokes this sense of injustice, and how the
injustice can be corrected, is essential to the rule of law, and, in turn, requires the
idea-if not the sense-of justice. The human mind being somewhat efficient for
its purposes, an institutionalization of the quest for this idea and its practical
implications is likely to be in some degree availing to develop the idea and show
how it can be put into practice. Thus, where a complaint is loudly voiced, a
society that attempts to do so can probably discern some condition giving just
ground for the complaint, and set about correcting it.
This, of course, accords perfectly with the common law tradition of a
revisionistic and evolutionary, rather than an idealistic and revolutionary, function
for law. It is through this revisionistic tradition that Maritain's philosophy of
history embraces what is most attractive not only in Cahn's thesis, but also in the
theory sometimes advanced of a "natural law with changing content," and in the
notion, already alluded to, of the mores of the society as shaping the ideals of
the law.
At this point we can attempt to redefine natural law in the light of the
evaluative considerations introduced by the philosophy of history. Natural law
thus redefined would be the norm for evaluating legal events in terms of the
demands of human nature in a given historicalcontext. Thus conceived, it would

be an adequate evaluative principle, as it would include both moral and methodo6.
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logical elements. It would direct the law toward the actualization of the
potentialities for good in the particular historical context. It would be subordinated to morality (or natural law in the sense of morality), because human
nature in a given context cannot be inconsistent with human nature in general.
It would, however, provide a methodological principle of choice between alternatives that morality leaves open, and a moral principle for confining choice to
alternatives that are methodologically available.
It should be apparent that the historical element in the natural law as thus
conceived is not an element of mere expediency. It is, to be sure, a methodological
element, and there is a sense in which any methodological consideration can be
characterized as one of expediency. At the same time, natural law remains an
ideal or a norm to which the methodology ought to be directed. It remains also a
guide for choice, since history as Maritain sees it leaves some kind of choice
between good and evil always methodologically open.
As long as there is such a choice between good and evil, we cannot fall into
the kind of expediency that is the mark of an institution with no higher aim than
to perpetuate itself qua institution. The judge or lawyer who defies the political
branches of the government is usually regarded as a particularly successful
exponent of the legal methodology, and of the political state itself human nature
may come to demand in a given historical context that it show that it knows how
to perish without compromising the principles to which it is committed. It is
precisely at this point where power is least that moral suasion is greatest-the
point Maritain seems to be making with his "law of the hierarchy of means."
In the foregoing discussion, no attempt has been made to give a general
account of Maritain's philosophy of history, beyond what bears on its possible
implications for the natural law. Maritain takes a long view of history and an
exalted one; at the same time, he grounds himself, like a good Thomist, on the
commonplaces of experience. He writes also with a lack of dogmatism which,
without ever compromising his philosophical realism, suggests always that his
formulas are an attempt to approach reality, not to supplant it.
Maritain says at the outset that his philosophy of history presupposes human
free will and the existence of God. In addition, he writes as a Christian, pursuant
to his conviction that practical, as distinguished from speculative, philosophy must
take into account the whole existential condition of man, drawing light from
whatever source it can. Within this framework, he sets the Christian a task of
vigorous involvement in the travail of the good to work itself free through the
order of time. In this, his doctrine must be set in opposition to any doctrine
that entails a reductive interpretation of the historical context as it affects the
temporal mission of the Christian-that matter is merely evil, that the Gospels
are a self-sufficient basis for social reform, or that no purpose is to be looked
for in created things beyond their own proper natures or the salvation of the
human beings that deal with them.
This reviewer, for his own part, sees the basic Christian annroach to created
things in terms of an analogue of the Incarnation. Lawmen, Christian and nonChristian, have operated in a comparable framework when they have attempted
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through their legal institutions to give practical content to-to "incarnate" as it
were-some dream of liberty or justice.
It is this "incarnational" orientation that constitutes the particular attraction
of a well-thought-out philosophy of history. Had Maritain exploited the affinity
for the Christian doctrine of the Logos in the Hegelian vision of the self-awareness
of the Spirit unfolding through the dialectic movements of history, he might
have brought out this orientation more fully, and in so doing done fuller justice
to Hegel. But even as it stands, Maritain's doctrine has this incarnational
orientation present in it; it is this that provides a congenial setting for the considerations of legal methodology that have been discussed in this review. At the
same time, Maritain's view of history does what Hegel's never did: it provides us
with the basis for knowledgeable cooperation in the incarnative process, through
its insistence on ethical aspirations that emanate from outside history. It is
through this juxtaposition of historical and extrahistorical elements that Maritain's
philosophy of history has an important insight to offer, not only for the Christian
striving in his own place to further the Incarnation of the Word in time, but
also for anyone with a dream to which he wishes to impart reality.
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